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Droit de Suite: Just How Sweet is it?
By Asher Tanenbaum
I. Introduction
A. The Issue to be Discussed 
 The primary purpose of United States copyright law is “[t]o promote the Progress of 
Science”.1  Copyright law incentivizes the progress of science through a set of six exclusive 
rights available for the owner‘s exploitation of his copyright.2  At the behest of Congress, the 
Copyright Office is currently  reviewing the creation of a new right for creators of visual artworks 
(VAs)3  that  would require a royalty payment to be paid to a creator upon secondary  sales of his 
VAs.4  This paper analyzes the impact such a law may have on the creation of and market for VAs 
and concludes that it would be imprudent to add this royalty  right because the negative effects 
would be greater than the benefit obtained.
 In 1920 France became the first nation to create the proposed royalty  right, which is 
widely  referred to by its French name Droit de Suite (DdS).5 A handful of countries followed suit 
1
1 U.S. Const.  art. 1, § 8 cl. 8. The term “science” as used in Clause 8 refers not to science in the modern sense, but in 
an archaic meaning that refers to works that are copyrightable matter.
2 17 U.S.C.S. § 106 (2012). These are the right to distribute, reproduce, make derivative works, publicly display, 
perform, and transmit.
3  See 17 U.S.C.S. § 101 (2012) (defining visual art). VAs are anything from sculpture or painting to a cartoon or 
conceptual art. Basically, it is anything that can be considered artwork and not something like a book or lyrics.
4 Comment Notice, 77 Fed. Reg. 58175 (Sept. 19, 2012).
5  Tʜᴇ Cᴏᴜɴᴄɪʟ ᴏғ Eᴜʀᴏᴘᴇ Fʀᴇɴᴄʜ-Eɴɢʟɪsʜ Dɪᴄᴛɪᴏɴᴀʀʏ 100, (F.H.S. Bridge ed., Council Press of Europe 1994) 
(defining Droit de Suite as the “right to trace or follow property into the hands of a third person”) (quotes in 
original).
in proceeding years6 and the European Union recently mandated a DdS right by member states.7 
In 1976, California became the only Unted States jurisidiction where creators have DdS rights.8 
Australia joined these ranks in 2009 when it created DdS rights for creators of VAs.9
 In the United States, the creator of any copyrighted work currently has no control over or 
rights arising from secondary sales of a work itself due to the First  Sale Doctrine (FSD). Once 
purchased, the new owner can largely  use or sell a work as he pleases.10  By  contrast, DdS laws 
give VA creators a royalty interest in secondary sales and would partially  negate the FSD,11 
which could impact the primary and secondary VA market. As with most laws, the terms12 of any 
DdS law will be a strong determinant of its success or failure because these will influence 
whether its costs are greater or lesser than the benefits it creates.
 In the countries with DdS, the DdS laws generally contain six elements.13 First is the time 
period in which the right is in effect for, which is usually co-equal with the copyright duration. 
2
6  U.N.E.S.C.O. Cᴏᴘʏʀɪɢʜᴛ Dɪᴠɪsɪᴏɴ, Dʀᴏɪᴛ ᴅᴇ Sᴜɪᴛᴇ,  1 (United Nations Educational, Scientific,  and Cultural 
Organization) (1949), http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001439/143961eb.pdf (last visited Dec. 6, 2012) 
(citing Belgium in 1921, Czechoslovakia in 1926, Poland in 1935, Uruguay in 1937, and Ialy in 1942).
7 Council Directive 01/84, 2001 O.J. (L 272) 32 (EC).
8 Cal. Civil Code § 986 (2012). Invalidated by Estate of Graham v. Sotheby’s, Inc.,  860 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (2012) 
(finding the statute unconstitutional on the grounds that it violates the dormant commerce clause).
9 The Resale Royalty Right for Visual Artists Act, 2009, C. 2009A00125 (Austl.).
10 The FSD is found in 17 U.S.C.S. § 109 (2012). The FSD arose from judical precedent but Congress codified it in 
1976. Some minor exceptions are found in 17 U.S.C.S. § 106A but they are not germane to this paper. 
11 The FSD would be partially negated in the sense that the owner does not now possess the complete ability to use 
the work as he pleases because he will not receive the entire sales amount but will have to hand over part of it to a 
creator. It is also possible that a creator may receive some type of say in how the work is used or sold if the creator 
possesses a contingent legal interest in the work by dint of his DdS right.
12  A discussion of the many possible permutations of a DdS law is important for an understanding of how DdS 
would work, but it will not be discussed in this paper due to space constraints.
13 The European Union’s Council Directive 01/84, 2001 O.J.  (L 272) 32 (EC) is a good example to look to for the 
elements of a DdS statute. Using a hypothetical example, DdS works as follows: A 5% royalty will be paid on a 
work that sells at auction in France for $10,000 that was created by Picasso since his works are still under copyright 
protection,  despite the fact that the owner of the work purchased the work for the same $10,000 amount he is 
receiving.  See also The Resale Royalty Right for Visual Artists Act, 2009, C. 2009A00125 (Austl.).
Second is a minimum sales amount whereby  any  sales at or above that amount require the DdS 
royalty to be paid on the sale. Third is the royalty percentage rate that usually attaches to the 
entire sales amount rather than only gains. Fourth is that the royalty  right generally attaches only 
to auction sales rather than all sales. Fifth is that the royalty right  attaches only to sales taking 
place in the jurisdiction with the DdS right rather than the residency of the parties. And the sixth 
is that the work must be a VA. Each country varies in the exact terms, but every DdS law 
addresses these six items.
 The literature on DdS is quite extensive with many rehashing similar arguments premised 
upon DdS being an equitable right for artists or unfair to buyers.14  Little attention appears to go 
towards examining the effectiveness of DdS as an incentive or through an economics 
perspective. This is partly because while there is some data that can be used to compare the 
economic impact of DdS on countries that have it as compared to those that do not, it is much 
more difficult to compare the potential effects of DdS if it  is implemented because each country 
has its own unique dynamics.15  It  is not so easy to move away from discussing equity or 
unfairness when there is not so much data to use for either discussion.
3
14 See e.g.  Jean-Luc Piotraut, An Author’s Rights-Based Copyright Law: The Fairness and Morality of French and 
American Law Compared,  24 Cardozo Arts & Ent L.J. 54 (2006) (comparing the moral underpinnings of much of 
French copyright law as compared to American copyright law); Michael B.Reddy, The Droit de Suite: Why 
American Fine Artists Should Have the Right to a Resale Royalty, 15 Loy. L.A. Ent. L.J. 509 (1995) (looking at the 
origins of DdS); Jennifer B. Pfeffer, Comment, The Costs and Legal Impracticalities Facing Implementation of the 
European Union's Droit de Suite Directive in the United Kingdom, 24 Nw. J.  Int'l L. & Bus. 533 (2004) (discussing 
DdS in terms of common-law rights); Thomas M. Goetzl & Stuart A. Sutton, Copyright and The Visual Artist's 
Display Right: A New Doctrinal Analysis,  9 Colum.-VLA Art & L. 15 (1985) (examining how DdS can affect 
owners and buyers); Shira Perlmutter,  Resale Royalties for Artists: An Analysis of the Register of Copyrights' 
Report, 16 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 395 (1992) (criticizing Tʜᴇ Rᴇᴘᴏʀᴛ, infra note 15, for using theoretical 
examples to balance against real-life examples).
15  Among these reasons is that prices fluctuate regardless of market conditions, work quality changes,  demand for 
certain types of works and artists shifts, and general factors related to macro-economic forces. In essence, since VAs 
are not commodities and are all different it is extremely difficult to isolate the factors impacting a market to compare 
and contrast different markets, let alone a single market pre- and post-DdS.
 There are several recurring sources used in this paper, two of which are the most 
important. The primary document is a 1992 report  issued by the Copyright Office, referred to as 
Tʜᴇ Rᴇᴘᴏʀᴛ,16  that examined DdS to analyze whether Congress should implement it. Tʜᴇ 
Rᴇᴘᴏʀᴛ is analogous to the report Congress recently requested the Copyright Office to issue.17 To 
help  analyze the economic effects of DdS the article An Economic Theory of Avant-Garde and 
Popular Art, or High and Low Culture is very  useful.18  These are the two primary sources that 
have informed this paper.
 This paper analyzes DdS primarily through the lens of economic theory and principles, 
which should shed some new light on the topic because economic analysis is often absent from 
the existing literature. The analysis proceeds through a dual framework of the impact of DdS first 
on creators and second on buyers. To understand the full picture an examination of both sides’ 
positions must be examined for proper insight into the full scope of DdS’s impact. 
 Because neither group of creators nor buyers is itself a monolithic group, this paper 
further splits each group into three types of creators and buyers, respectively, that will be used to 
better understand the effects on the groups of which buyers and sellers are composed.19 The three 
types of creator are Career Creator, Hobbyist, and Unique Creator and will be described in 
Section II. The three types of buyers are Beauty, Investor, and Brag and will be described in 
4
16  Rᴇɢɪsᴛᴇʀ ᴏғ Cᴏᴘʏʀɪɢʜᴛs, Dʀᴏɪᴛ ᴅᴇ Sᴜɪᴛᴇ: Tʜᴇ Aʀᴛɪsᴛ’s Rᴇsᴀʟᴇ Rᴏʏᴀʟᴛʏ (Library of Congress) (1992) 
[Hereinafter Tʜᴇ Rᴇᴘᴏʀᴛ], available at http://www.copyright.gov/history/droit_de_suite.pdf (last visited Dec. 9, 
2012).
17 See supra note 3.
18  Tyler Cowen & Alexander Tabarrok, An Economic Theory of Avant-Garde and Popular Art,  or High and Low 
Culture, S. Econ. J. 67(2), 232 (2000).
19  The existence of both of these sets of three types is not a rule, but it helps to distinguish between the different 
motivations of generally distinct types of creators and buyers.
Section III. Understanding why each of these groups act as they do should lead to a strong grasp 
of how DdS uniquely affects creators and buyers and the respective subgroups. 
B. Organization of the Paper
  Part  II focuses on incentives and how they work in theory and practice. Part II-A of this 
paper looks at the purpose of copyright law in the United States and how DdS may impact the 
incentives that currently underpin copyright law such that DdS may result in a negative or 
positive change in output relative to those goals. Part II-A concludes that DdS is not an effective 
incentive because it  works differently than existing incentives. Part II-B examines the ways that 
DdS will impact the type and quality  of VAs created compared to creations under existing 
incentives by comparing how the three types of creators react differently  to incentives. Part II-B 
concludes that DdS will not improve or change the quality or quantity of VAs created.
 Part III examines how buyers and sellers in the marketplace for primary  and secondary 
sales of VAs would be impacted by  and react to a DdS right. Part III-A looks at how DdS shifts 
the rewards for risk-taking and concludes that this could have a strong impact on the market. Part 
III-B looks at whether buyers will pay a discounted purchase price to make up for DdS 
potentially taking later gains and concludes that this is unlikely to occur. Part III-C examines 
whether the location of sales would move outside of the United States with DDS and concludes 
that this is not very  likely. Part III-D concudes that DdS would have an overall negative effect  on 
the market largely because of how it shifts the current risk-reward balance of a VA purchase.
 Part IV concludes that DdS should not be implemented because the overall social utility 
of DdS is below that  of the status quo given the purposes of copyright law in balancing creators’ 
incentives against the overall public benefit obtained from the works created because of those 
5
incentives. Ultimately, DdS fails because the benefit to creators individually  is too speculative 
and its incentive-effect to increase output is low while its potential impact on the market in the 
form of playing with risk and reward is strong, causing the costs of DdS to outweigh the benefits. 
II. The Relationship of Droit de Suite and Incentives to Create
 As described in Part I, the essence of copyright law is to provide to creators incentives 
and legal protection to exploit those incentives so that creators will produce more and better 
works than would be created absent those incentives. At heart, it is meant not to enrich creators 
but to enrich American society as a whole.20  Thus, a proposed incentive such as DdS must 
increase creators’ contributions to society. If it does not, then DdS is simply an extra cost placed 
on society for which society receives no more than before in return. 
 Looking at incentives through the lens of the three types of buyers will be helpful. The 
first type of creator, Career Creator, primarily seeks financial success by reaching the biggest 
market or making VAs that are certain to have a more definite immediate sales value. This group 
is mostly comprised of creators for whom creation is their primary job or at least  a successful 
hobby that provides steady income. The second type of creator, Hobbyist, strives to create simply 
for enjoyment. 21 Hobbyists are comprised mostly  of creators who are not market-seeking but  for 
6
20 Twentieth Century Corp.  v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) superseded on other grounds by 17 U.S.C.S § 110(5) 
(2012):
The limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory monopoly, like the limited copyright duration 
required by the Constitution, reflects a balance of competing claims upon the public interest: Creative 
work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of 
promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the other arts. The immediate effect of our 
copyright law is to secure a fair return for an "author's" creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this 
incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.
21 Jacey, supra note 23, at 1574 (“Other artists do not create for an audience but rather for themselves. For them, the 
need to write or paint is an integral part of their personality.”).
whom a sale is a nice side benefit.22  The third type of creator, Unique Creator, seeks to be 
different and unique in quest of recognition. Unique Creators are professional creators and those 
whom create seriously as a hopefully-successful hobby. Depending on the type of creator, the 
same incentives play different roles in their ability and decision to create.
   A. Incentives for Creation
 Incentives are the key to how United States copyright law promotes new creations. This 
subsection examines how they fulfill this purpose by looking at (1) how incentives work, (2) 
DdS as an intersection of equity  and incentive, and (3) at which creators DdS benefits the most. 
The prior three sections are wound-up in (4) with a recap of the salient points.
1. The Effect of Incentives 
 The six right  currently granted to creators by copyright law allow creators to exploit  their 
works and thus act as incentives to create. All creators are given these rights because works of 
even minimal creativity  are deemed to be of overall benefit to society no matter the uniqueness 
of what the work gives to society.23  Incentives encourage creation by  giving a successful creator 
the financial ability to continue to create and to cover the costs of creating. While copyright law 
is not grounded in equity,24 there is a sense of fairness inherent in these rights such that it would 
7
22  Sixty percent of recreational artists sold a work in 2008 and there are 600,000 professional and 3.2 million 
recreational artists. Aʀᴛɪsᴛs & Aʀᴛ Mᴀᴛᴇʀɪᴀʟs USA 2009 Exᴇᴄᴜᴛɪᴠᴇ Sᴜᴍᴍᴀʀʏ 2 (International Art Materials Trade 
Association, Cornelius, N.C.) (2009). 
23 Feist Publ’ns, Inc v. Rural Tele. Servs. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345-46 (1991): 
To be sure, the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice. The vast 
majority of works make the grade quite easily, as they possess some creative spark, "no matter how 
crude, humble or obvious" it might be. Originality does not signify novelty; a work may be original 
even though it closely resembles other works so long as the similarity is fortuitous, not the result of 
copying. To illustrate, assume that two poets,  each ignorant of the other, compose identical poems. 
Neither work is novel, yet both are original and, hence, copyrightable. 
24 See supra note 20.
be unfair to a creator not  to possess them while allowing others to freely reap  the benefit  of the 
creator’s efforts.25 Incentives thus encourage creation.
 If incentives work properly, successful creators will gain more financially than 
unsuccessful creators and will be able to create more works while unsuccessful creators will be 
unable to afford to continue pursuing a career as a creator.26 In effect, it  is comparative advantage 
at work.27  This pattern sometimes falters when certain creators are very innovative and their 
works are undervalued initially  because their work is not yet appreciated, limiting their ability to 
succeed financially and potentally increase their production. A number of now-famous creators 
suffered this fate throughout the centuries.28  While incentives may falter in a few instances like 
these, most creators who fail to gain financially  in their lifetimes will never be important or 
appreciated. Consequently, the desired incentive-effect works the vast majority  of the time by 
rewarding successful creators by giving them greater ability  to continue to create and not 
rewarding unsuccessful creators whose work, by dint  of the lack of a market,29  is less useful to 
society than successful creators’ works, thereby limiting their ability to create.
 2. Droit de Suite: Incentive or Equitable Right?
8
25 Int’l News Serv. v. Assoc. Press, 248 U.S. 215, 244 (1918) (citing Morris v.  Ashbee, L.R. 7 Eq. 34 (1868)) (“[N]o 
one has a right to take the results of the labour and expense incurred by another for the purposes of a rival 
publication, and thereby save himself the expense and labour of working out and arriving at these results by some 
independent road.”).
26 Linda Jacey, Of Bread and Roses and Copyrights, 1989 Duke L.J. 1532,1572 (1989) (relating statistics about the 
difficulty of pursuing a career solely as a creator).
27 Comparative advantage is an economic principle which essentially states that those who are more successful and 
better at doing something will continue to do so while those who are not will leave and find something to which they 
are better suited to produce.
28 Jacey, supra note 23, at 1572 (using Van Gogh as an example). See also Jᴇғғʀᴇʏ Mᴇʏᴇʀs,  Iᴍᴘʀᴇssɪᴏɴɪsᴛ Qᴜᴀʀᴛᴇᴛ: 
Tʜᴇ Iɴᴛɪᴍᴀᴛᴇ Gᴇɴɪᴜs Oғ Mᴀɴᴇᴛ Aɴᴅ Mᴏʀɪsᴏᴛ,  Dᴇɢᴀs Aɴᴅ Cᴀssᴀᴛᴛ (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt) (2005) (telling 
how the artists in the title were often derided for their VAs during their careers).
29 Tʜᴇ Rᴇᴘᴏʀᴛ, supra note 15 app. pt. I Comment Letters at 76, Testimony of R. Frederick Woolworth in Opposition 
to H.R. 3221 (saying that only about 300 out of 200,000 artists have a secondary market for their works). See also 
Tʜᴇ Rᴇᴘᴏʀᴛ, supra note 15, at 132-3 (relating thoughts on the effect of DdS on less-well-known creators). 
 While DdS is an incentive in form, it is entangled with being an equitable vehicle for 
creators.30  An incentive is something “which urges to action, especially a promised reward for 
working harder.”31  To urge to action, it must  be forward-looking. In contrast, a right of equity in 
this context would be based upon rewarding past  efforts and be something the creator would gain 
that does not result solely from the creator’s own choices.
 Incentives are necessary to spawn a professional class of creators. The demand for a 
successful employee is stronger than for an average employee because of his scarcity, which 
causes his earnings to rise. Similarly, the creator of desirable works will see the price of his 
works go up32 - the reward for his scarcity. Without the incentive of higher earnings for success, 
a creator is unlikely to be able to afford to pursue a career as a pofessional creator.
 A caveat to the prior reward principle is that a successful employee’s past work is not 
necessarily rewarded to the extent of his success at that time. An employee is not paid based 
upon future value obtained by his employer from the employee’s work, all of which accrues to 
the employer. Instead, the employee is paid based on his proven ability to succeed and not for the 
specific gains he imparted to the employer when he was not yet proven to be succesful. The 
amount an employer is willing to pay an employee is the value of the employee’s work at the 
time and not the potential future gains from that work. 
 In two ways the creator’s situation is analogous to that of an employee and in one way 
not. It is analogous in that the increase in value of a creator’s work accrues to the buyer of a work 
9
30 Pfeffer, supra note 13,  at 547 (“Most proponents of the droit de suite argue that it is an economic right, because it 
protects an economic interest.  However, despite having some of the properties of economic rights, it has enough 
characteristics of a moral right to make it unfamiliar to common law copyright law.”).
31 MᴀᴄMɪʟʟᴀɴ Dɪᴄᴛɪᴏɴᴀʀʏ ғᴏʀ Sᴛᴜᴅᴇɴᴛs 519 (Simon & Schuster Books For Young Readers) (1984).
32  Tʜᴇ Rᴇᴘᴏʀᴛ, supra note 15, at 131. (“Additionally, successful artists...secure ever increasing prices as their 
reputations grow and they sell successive works”).
and that a successful creator whose old works have increased in value will likely earn more for 
his new works than what he earned from the works he sold when he was unknown.33  The non-
analogous item is that the creator possesses his quiver of six rights with which to exploit his 
work, which allows the creator to earn more from his prior work should he choose to exploit 
these rights. Although the creator is mostly in the same position as an employee, he is posotioned 
slightly better because has the ability to exploit his prior work through his quiver of six rights.
 DdS rewards creators from the future value gained and imbued into their VAs by buyers 
and differs from the other six rights because it rewards the creator not for his efforts but rather 
for the VA owner’s decisions. It is effectively an unexploitable incentive because the creator 
cannot choose when to exploit it, if at all. Because the creator cannot freely  exploit it, it  becomes 
a right of equity instead of an urge to action to create. DdS is then a reward not  for effort but for 
the mere fact that the owner decided to sell the VA. 
 Although DdS may not be an incentive per se and it may not  be fully exploitable by the 
creator, it could still potentially act as incentive in practice and this paper will examine it as such 
in Part II-B. In terms of DdS as an equitable right, Part III-B will examine whether demand and 
the concurrent market forces are a form of contribution to a VA’s value by buyers.34
3. Some Creators Will Benefit More From DdS
10
33  Id. at 6. This can be inferred from the idea discused therein that the rationale that a creator should benefit from 
increases in the work’s value is because of his continued efforts to create. If the creator has worked and thereby 
increased his reputation and the value of his old works,  then his new works will also increase in value from 
recognition.
34  Patricia Cohen, Artists File Lawsuits, Seeking Royalties, N.Y. Tɪᴍᴇs, Nov. 1, 2011, at C1, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/11/02/arts/design/artists-file-suit-against-sothebys-christies-and-ebay.html?
sq=copyright&st=cse&scp=4 (last visited Dec. 3, 2012). (“The increased price for Rauschenberg’s “Thaw” at the 
Scull auction was due not only to the artist’s continuing creative efforts,  he said, but also to the dealers, collectors, 
auction houses and critics who took a risk in supporting and buying Rauschenberg’s work before he was famous.”).
 As with all incentives, the rewards of DdS will flow unevenly. 35  The creators who will 
gain most from DdS are the most  successful to begin with because their VAs sell for more than 
less-successful creators’ VAs and so they  will receive more in royalties no matter when in life 
they  become sought-out. The highest-valued creators will receive a disproportionate amount of 
total royalties because a few VAs sell for extremely high amounts and make up a large proportion 
of total sales while most VAs sell for much smaller sums.36  These successful creators are also 
able to earn the most from selling new VAs, assuming they are still alive. Unknown and less-
successful creators will largely  gain nothing because most VAs never reach the floor-level value 
at which DdS kicks in.37
 Although not likely, it  is possible that DdS could have a negative impact on creators who 
do not receive it. This could occur by reducing the amount of money available to purchase lesser 
VAs because the money  being paid as a royalty might otherwise be used to purchase these VAs. 
Fewer VAs may be sold as a result of VAs being more expensive to purchase, or prices for all 
VAs could simply decrease across the board to make up  for it, hurting everyone. Overall, because 
most VAs do not sell for much, the theoretical negatives are unlikely to occur while the few who 
do receive the royalty will be earning something - much more than the nothing they currently 
receive from secondary sales. 
11
35  The floor value of where DdS takes effect would exclude most works by the vast majority of creators from its 
scope. These creators will never see a dime from DdS. Consequently, while creators can strive to make works that 
reach the requisite values, most will never succeed in doing so.
36  See Cᴏɴᴛᴇᴍᴘᴏʀᴀʀʏ Aʀᴛ Mᴀʀᴋᴇᴛ 2011/2012: Tʜᴇ Aʀᴛᴘʀɪᴄᴇ Aɴɴᴜᴀʟ Rᴇᴘᴏʀᴛ 16 (Artprice) (2012) (listing the 
highest auction prices in 2011 for VAs, with the artist Michael Basquiat dominating the list).
37  Using 2011-12 statistics available for France, which has the most entrenched DdS law, works auctioned from 
€5000 (approximately $6447 at the Oct. 28, 2012 exchange rate) and under made up 88% of the contemporary art 
auction market (these works cover a large portion of works DdS would cover overall), compared to an overall 
French art market of $521 million. Aʀᴛ Mᴀʀᴋᴇᴛ Tʀᴇɴᴅs 2011 6 (Artprice) (2012).
4. Incentives Work When They Are Exploitable
 What can be gleaned from foregoing three sections is that incentives work together with 
comparative advantage to reward successful creators the most because their VAs are desired, 
which allows them to afford to continue to create by exploiting the increasing value of their VAs 
through their quiver of rights. DdS, on the other hand, is not as exploitable by creators as the 
other six rights because it relies on the owner to sell the VA and thus it does not incentivize more 
creation. Finally, although DdS rewards the most successful creators more than others, the 
majority  of creators are not likely  to suffer harm from this unbalanced reward because it won’t 
change how they are rewarded.
 
B. In What Way Do Incentives Impact New Creations?
 The effectiveness of an incentive is the ultimate determinant of its social utility and 
therefore its value. This section helps to develop an understanding of DdS’s effectiveness by (1) 
examining why different creators are motivated to create and (2) looking at the impact DdS may 
have on the types of VAs produced given those differing motivations. This section concludes that 
DdS fails as an incentive because it does not increase the quantity or quality of VAs produced.
1. The Three Creators: How Incentives Affect Why They Create
 Each creator differs in his goals from other creators38  and as a result a given incentive 
affects each differently. Understanding why creators create is crucial to understanding how 
incentives affect them. Given creators’ differing motivations and despite possible overlap at 
times, the classifications of creators into the three groups described earlier in this Part allows a 
general view with regard to how incentives may affect what each type of creator creates.
12
38 Jacey, supra note 23, at 1574 (laying out different motivations for creators.).
 Starting with Career Creator, greater incentives may increase the number of creators in 
this group because they are driven by earning power, and thus more incentives can mean more 
creation if the incentive means more income. However, it is unclear how an increase in Career 
Creators will affect the market because if there are more creators and thus more supply then the 
value of each VA may decrease, countering the positive effect  of potentially greater rewards. 
Thus, despite the possibility  of greater income, an increase in incentives may  result in no net gain 
of creators to Career Creator as a group.
 Of the three groups, Hobbyist is least affected by incentives because they create without 
regard to incentives. Many Hobbyists may be prevented from marketing their VAs because of a 
limited skill set and are therefore unable to produce marketable VAs or are prevented from being 
a Career Creator because of the need to earn a higher or more predictable income in another 
profession. While Hobbyists need no incentives to create, increased incentives could allow some 
Hobbyists to make a career from doing something they enjoy doing for its own sake. 
 While not entirely  distinct  from the former two groups, Unique Creator is affected by 
incentives in ways distinct from the other two.39  While fame and uniqueness drive Unique 
Creator more than money, among the three groups DdS would likely have the biggest impact on 
Unique Creator precisely because of their desire to be different.40  Value accrues in VAs that gain 
recognition over time and if a Unique Creator succeeds then the value of his work will increase 
13
39  Cowen & Tabarrok, supra note 16, at 247-8 (2000). (describing how avant garde artists are not likely to create 
popular art despite the incentives available for it).
40  Jimmy A. Frazier, Comment, On Moral Rights, Artist-Centered Legislation, and the Role of the State in Art 
Worlds: Notes On Building A Sociology of Copyright Law,  70 Tul. L. Rev. 313, 325 (1995). (discussing “mavericks” 
in the art world who reject convention).
by magnitudes and thereby benefit Unique Creator in the long-run.41  In most instances it  is not 
the commercial art of Career Creator or Hobbyist that obtains the greatest acclaim and value, but 
rather the Unique Creator’s. In terms of being an incentive, high market value is a sign of the 
recognition sought by Unique Creator but it is not the reason they create. Incentives certainly can 
push Unique Creator, but they are not crucial for the choice to create.
 It is clear that  the effect of incentives on Career Creator is high, on Hobbyist essentially 
non-existent, and for Unique Creator moderate.
2. DdS and Its Effects: What The Three Creators Create
 With the understanding gained in Subsection 1 about how incentives affect the three types 
of creators, it is now time to analyze the impact DdS would have on why and what each of the 
three creators create. Copyright law provides incentives for creation in pursuit of an overall 
benefit to society  while concurrently balancing those incentives against the public benefit 
obtained in return. If the balance is even or in benefit  of society then an incentive should be 
considered for implementation.42  Congruently, if the balance falls against society, then the 
incentive should not be used. This balance will be used to determine the beneficiality of DdS as 
an incentive within the framework of copyright law.
 Evaluating the quality of VAs is difficult due to the subjective nature of taste and the 
unpredictability of the art world.43  Some VAs once derided or deemed unworthy of attention are 
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41 The creators whose works gain the most value are the ones who were groundbreaking and original. Look at the 
works of Andy Warhol, Vincent Van Gogh, and Pablo Picasso for examples.  They were all groundbreaking with no 
one like them before they came along and their works are immense sums today. Compare these artists’  work to the 
works of a street-artist in Times Square.The street artist may have nice work, but it is not groundbreaking and thus 
will not be worth a lot.
42 See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v Aiken, supra note 18.
43 Frazier,  supra note 38, at 326 (discussing how the greatness of an artist depends much on how society supports 
him and not necessarily the aesthetics).
considered groundbreaking today while other once-esteemed VAs are considered nothing of note 
today, assuming value and critical reception are proxies of quality.44  Determining whether a 
period with a dearth or plethora of groundbreaking VAs results from normal flows of ideas and 
concepts trickling through from larger social dynamics or instead from an incentive is tough 
because there are many variables to isolate. Quality is even more difficult to assess when 
attempting to analyze the affect a proposed incentive may have on the creation of future VAs. 
Further, while the quantity of VAs is measurable the effect of an incentive on the amount created 
is not easily estimable for the same reasons. While quality  is certainly in the eye of the beholder, 
the only possible determinant is the long-term general perception by the market and critics. 
 Subpart i examines the effect of DdS on the output of both Career Creator and Hobbyist 
while Subpart ii examines the effect of DdS on the output of Unique Creator.
i
 Much the same as it  is with incentives in general as discussed in Part II-1, the effect of 
DdS on Career Creator is the least certain amongst the three creators. DdS would seem to 
increase the quantity and quality of VAs by Career Creator. But DdS may decrease the output of 
Career Creator by pushing them to be more creative and thus towards becoming Unique 
Creators.45 This may  occur because greater potential profit is not now necessarily  in creating VAs 
with a more immediate and predictable value but in VAs that are groundbreaking because those 
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44 Robin Pogrebin & Kevin Flynn, Does Money Grow on Art Market Trees? Not for Everyone, N.Y. Tɪᴍᴇs, May 31, 
2011, at C1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/31/arts/design/not-all-art-market-prices-are-soaring.html. 
(last visited Dec. 3, 2012) (mentioning the changing market performances of various creators).
45 While this paper is talking about the market size increasing, the creation of a DdS right for these artists is in effect 
an increase in market size because it increases the amount of money potentially available to them than otherwise 
may exist. See Cowen & Tabarrok, supra note 16, at 242.
VAs have the greatest  potential value.46  This factor can also uphold the status quo because of the 
speculativity of the profit while Career Creator may need immediate income from producing his 
usual work-product if the need for immediate income made him a Career Creator to begin with.47 
These competing considerations make the affect of DdS unpredictable for Career Creator.
 VAs created by Hobbyist are unlikely to change in quality or quantity as aresult of  DdS. 
Hobbyist generally does not sell his VAs and if he does they are not  likely  to be worth much, let 
alone meet the floor value for DdS. Neither the quality nor quantity  of VAs created by Hobbyist 
will change because it is impossible to incentivize creation for something which has no market.
ii
 The impact of DdS on Unique Creator potentially is the greates of all three groups due to 
two primary  factors. First is the potential influx of Career Creators, discussed in Subpart i, who 
may become Unique Creators if the long-term profit potential is substantial which could lead to 
more VAs produced by Unique Creators. The second is the potential for increased competition 
among Unique Creators seeking to be groundbreaking if being groundbreaking results not only 
in recognition but also greater financial rewards than successful creators currently derive from 
sales of new VAs.
 The first factor requires a second look at the issue of work quality discussed in Part II-
B-2. Here it  is in relation to whether the VAs of a newly-Unique Creator would be high quality or 
merely poor attempts at  being groundbreaking. Looking at it from a comparative advantage 
viewpoint, the issue is whether the skillset of newly-Unique Creators makes them better at 
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46  Tʜᴇ Rᴇᴘᴏʀᴛ, supra note 15, at 140-1 (“Like participants in a lottery, some individuals are attracted to high-risk 
careers in the arts for the possibility of an eventual large payoff…”).
47 Cowen & Tabarrok, supra note 16, at 237 (“An amateur artist who receives most of his income from labor in the 
manufacturing sector can afford to produce his own brand of art at little loss in income. A professional artist pays a 
high price for deviating from market taste.”).
producing their prior work-style or groundbreaking VAs. Concurrently, society is better off with 
the creation to which the creator’s skillset is best suited and thus parallel with his comparative 
advantage. While it is impossible to objectively determine whether a given VA is high quality48 
because of the changing opinions of artwork over time,49  it is possible for the market to 
objectively determine what work is demanded and therefore the comparative advantage of the 
creator should resolve whether a given creator should be a Unique or Career Creator. 
 Given that economics usually  determines a person’s choices, it is a fair assumption that in 
the aggregate creators’ decisions are in the spaces where their comparative advantage lies and 
that it is the type of creation to which the creator is best suited.50  Creators with an adaptable 
skillset will become and remain Unique Creators while those with fewer and less adaptable skills 
will never try or will switch back to being Career Creators if they  attempt being Unique Creators 
and cannot earn enough to pursue a career as a Unique Creator.51 Consequently, for creators who 
migrate from Career Creator to Unique Creator the overall quality  of work will increase.52  It is 
not easy to switch groups, but those that do switch and remain are the ones who will succeed.
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48 This impossibility is compounded when attempting to compare the quality of a given creator’s prior VAs as a 
Career Creator against his hypothetical VAs as a Unique Creator in order to determine whether the comparative 
advantage lies with being one or the other.
49  While it is easier with traditional art to objectively perceive the skill of the creator, contemporary art makes it 
tougher because it is more abstract and difficult to compare the creativity of works.
50  Cowen & Tabarrok,  supra note 16, at 241 (explaining that artists gravitate towards the buyers from which they 
can recieve the most remuneration for their type of work).
51 In regard to the ability of creators to shift from one group to another, a limiting factor may be whether the skill or 
creativity of a creator can improve enough such that it results in a true increase in work quality if there are greater 
incentives to produce “better” quality works. Creators may fall into one of the three groups precisely because they 
cannot fit into the other two because of their skill set. No matter how many people may desire to be Unique Creators 
there  may be a limit on what portion of overall creators will be recognized as such. Without this function, the values 
of works could become depressed overall.
52 This relies on another assumption that creative new ideas are of higher quality than unoriginal works. Unoriginal 
here refers simply to not being groundbreaking or uniquely special in terms of artistic significance, and not to the 
meaning as used in copyright law.
 Moving to the second factor, DdS may encourage the creation of experimental VAs that 
attempt to be groundbreaking. If a creator can gain from being not only groundbreaking at 
present but also in the future, there could be more experimental VAs created. But only if these 
VAs are valued in the future for their quality  in greater proportion than past VAs were valued in 
their futures can the new VAs resulting from DdS be considered higher quality. Although an 
incentive may change the style of work created, increased incentives also sometimes reduce 
quality. Quality could even decrease on average from an influx of experimental VAs while 
increasing the absolute number of quality VAs that succeed in being groundbreaking.53  An 
increase in experimental VAs would be positive if many turn out to be groundbreaking. 
 But Unique Creators’ ability to increase their experimental output, and thus 
groundbreadking VAs, is limited by their inelastic supply curve.54  While a fair assumption could 
be made that  DdS will increase the quality  of VAs created,55  it fails upon closer inspection. It 
fails because Unique Creators are normally  trying to be groundbreaking. Their supply curve is 
inelastic because no matter the increase in incentives they can’t make their work any more 
unique than they  currently  try to do because their success is already dependent upon their 
uniqueness. Increased incentives will not  change what Unique Creators create because they can’t 
change their uniqueness beyond what it already is in their attempts to be groundbreaking.
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53 Cowen & Tabarrok, supra note 16, at 248 (describing how pop artists and avant garde artists could both increase 
output but decrease avant garde art as a proportion of all works).
54 In economics, inelastic supply refers to the situation in which the supply of a product will not change very much 
despite large changes in the incentives that would spur increased supply of goods that have elastic supply. This 
situation could arise for many reasons including a limited supply of raw materials,  a limited speed of production, or 
a lack of workers available to increase production as necessary. See Dᴀᴠe Nᴇᴇᴅʜᴀᴍ ᴇᴛ ᴀʟ.,  Bᴜsɪɴᴇss ғᴏʀ Hɪɢʜᴇʀ 
Aᴡᴀʀᴅs 399 (Heinemann College) (2nd ed. 1999).
55 Carson W. Bays, Dᴏᴇs ᴀ Dʀᴏɪᴛ ᴅᴇ Sᴜɪᴛᴇ Bᴇɴᴇғɪᴛ Aʀᴛɪsᴛs? Tʜᴇ Cᴀsᴇ ᴏғ Cᴀʟɪғᴏʀɴɪᴀ, 3 (2006), available at http://
www.fokus.or.at/fileadmin/fokus/user/downloads/acei_paper/Bays.doc. (last visited Dec. 3, 2012) (describing the 
process by which DdS would create an interest for creators to maintain and improve work quality so that their 
oeuvre increases in value).
3. The Incentive Effect of DdS is Not So Strong
 The effect of DdS on the quality and quantity of the output by the three creators is not 
very strong. The differing motivations of the three types of creators is what determines the effect 
of incentives in general, and DdS in particular. For the Hobbyist it will have no effect because 
the Hobbyist does not sell his work. For Career Creator, the effect is difficult to discern because 
some Career Creators may or may not be able to become Unique Creators; most will probably 
not be able to change groups. For Unique Creators, the effect will not be strong because they 
already try their best to make groundbreaking VAs, which blunts any  potential positive impact 
resulting from greater incentives. The only way that DdS would affect Unique Creators is if it 
results in an influx of Career Creators into Unique Creators, and this is unlikely. On the whole, 
the incentive effect of DdS to increase quality and quantity is weak.  
 
III. Droit de Suite and the Market
 The costs of DdS will be borne by  market participants and there are several ways that 
market-participants may affect the market through their reaction to those costs. This section 
examines these effects in Subpart III-A by  looking at how DdS impacts the risk-reward concept 
by shifting some gains and no risk to the creator after the creator has already sold the rights to 
those potential gains and concludes that this can have a strong effect on the market. Subpart III-B 
examines whether buyers may discount purchase prices to account for the possibility of paying 
DdS and concludes that this is unlikely to occur. Subpart III-C examines the potential for DdS to 
cause sales to move to jurisdictions lacking DdS and concludes that such a shift is not likely. Part 
III-D sums up these sections and shows overall that DdS may negatively impact the market.
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 Because this section focuses on buyers, the three types of buyers listed in Part I-A will 
now be described. The first type, Beauty, primarily purchases VAs for their aesthetic value. The 
second type, Investor, purchases VAs primarily  for short- or long-term investment gain. The third 
type, Brag, buys either to have bragging rights or to show a sense of taste and culture through the 
VAs he purchases. These three groups will be used for the analysis throughout Section III.
A. To The Risk-Holder Goes The Spoils (And Losses)
 The owner of an item owns not just the item itself but also the right to resell that item,56 
and with this right the owner also takes on the risk that the item will increase or decrease in 
value.57  The bigger the risk, the greater the potential return.58  A creator could hold his VA and 
sell in the future when its value has potentially increased, but creators rid themselves of market 
risk by selling. Despite creators holding no risk, DdS would give creators an interest in gains but 
not losses59 and thus runs contrary to the principle of rewards flowing to risk-holders. In general, 
ownership conveys exclusively to the owner the rights to risk and reward.
 Buyers of anything forgo alternative uses of their money60  and take a financial risk by 
purchasing an item and the same holds true for VAs. No matter whether the buyer is Investor, 
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56  This comes from the FSD, which arises from 17 U.S.C.S. § 109 and states “the owner of a particular 
copy...lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the 
copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy...”.
57 In the Matter of: Artists’ Resale Royalties, 16 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 185, 241 (1992) (statement of Stephen E. 
Weil,  Deputy Director, Hirshhorn Museum) (“The risk of loss is and should be entirely on the collector. But if the 
collector bears the risk of loss, as he or she should, why should the collector not be entitled to the entire profit as a 
reward for his or her considerable risk.”). 
58 An example would be in the bond market where a low-quality bond that has a high probability of default pays the 
bondholder higher interest than a high-quality bond that has a low probability of default. The risk is greater and so 
the return is greater.
59 Stephen E. Weil, Resale Royalties: Nobody Benefits, 77 Art News 58, 60 (1978) (discussing how DdS laws allow 
losses and fall entirely on sellers while giving a portion of gains to creators).
60 Alternative investments encompass anything from buying stock in a company to buying antique cars to other VAs 
unaffected by the royalty. See id. at 60-1 (listing the possibilties for alternative investments).
Beauty, or Brag each could purchase VAs unaffected by DdS or other items altogether.61 
Similarly, rather than holding his VA, a selling creator exchanges his investment of holding the 
VA into an alternative investment in the form of obtaining money to use for other things. 
However, despite the creator having invested nothing in the VA after a sale,62  under DdS a 
creator benefits from a buyer’s risk-taking twofold with no congruent risk on the creator’s part.63 
The availability of alternative uses are the hallmark of any type of investment opportunity  and if 
the risk-reward ration is negatively affected, then buyers may turn to alternative uses.
 A creator need not sell his VAs.64  The creator who holds his own VAs is the risk-holder 
and thereby holds the potential upside rather than a buyer.65  The creator’s investment is not in 
money  or time but in the income forgone from not selling that he could have put to other uses.66 
By holding a VA a creator is betting that  a longer-term ownership of it will prove more valuable 
than the receipt of immediate payment.67  Once sold, market risk shifts to the buyer.68  Both 
parties get what they want, the buyer the VA itself and potential increases in its value, and the 
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61 However, there are arguments that VA buyers desire to purchase a specific work for its individual aesthetic value 
which cannot be had by buying any alternative work. See Goetzl & Sutton, supra note 13, at 49.
62 A creator’s post-initial-sale production of other new works could have an impact on the prices of prior works, but 
this is not an investment or risk taken in the work itself. Rather, it is an externality (which may be positive or 
negative on values) from the creator’s continued production.
63 The first instance is when the buyer purchases the VA from the creator and the second upon a secondary sale.
64 If he desires to create interest in his works to increase their value and exposure he could exhibit them. If he needs 
to sell them to earn income that is the same fate that nearly everybody must do in order to survive, namely providing 
services and skills in return for income.
65 Tʜᴇ Rᴇᴘᴏʀᴛ, supra note 15, at 141 (“The artist is faced with a choice of whether to sell his work today, or to hold 
the art as an investment for a certain time period. Asale will take place if the artist has a greater present need for 
consumption than the buyer. And although both the artist and the buyer agree on the future price of a work, they 
differ in their preference for present relative to future consumption.”).
66 Cowen & Tabarrok, supra note 16, at 239 (describing the effects that nonwage income has on consumption).
67 Joseph P. Bauer, Addressing the Incoherency of the Pre-emption Provision of the Copyright Act of 1976, 10 Vand. 
J. Ent.  & Tech L. 1, 33 n.124 (2007) (“Other possible reasons for the appreciation in value are that the artist may 
originally have undervalued the work or may have lacked the financial wherewithal to bargain for its full value.”).
68 Tʜᴇ Rᴇᴘᴏʀᴛ, supra note 15 at 136 (discussuing the risk of  decline in value after a purchase).
creator money for his time, effort, and ideas so that  he can earn a living and continue his creative 
career.69  Creators usually forgo holding the VA and sell sooner rather than later instead of 
gambling on a future valuation from which they would benefit anyways.70  Holding a VA until it 
becomes valuable is an option for the creator as much as it is for a buyer.71
 When a creator sells his VA he discharges the risk and reward that comes with owning the 
VA in return for the present value of the VA.72  Yet DdS allows the creator to keep a hand in the 
cookie jar. DdS disrupts the allocation of risk and reward by  giving the creator a contingent 
interest in the VA.73  The creator has no investment in the VA but can benefit  nonetheless. One 
conceptual way  that creators maintain an interest is if buyers discount their purchase price as 
discussed in Subpart III-B. In that event, creators’ interest in the VA is in the form of the those 
forgone earnings.74 After a sale and without this conceptual interest, the creator has no real stake 
in the VA’s risk.
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69  Id. at 141 note 71 (“[A]n artist needs money for food and shelter, as well as the costs associated with the 
preparation of his work, and may not have any choice about selling his work for present consumption.”).
70 Id.  app.  pt. I Comment Letters at 64, Arguments Againt the Resale Royalty (“When an artist's work is resold at a 
high price, the works which the artist has retained and has not sold become more valuable.”).
71 It is not certain they ever will become valuable,  this is the same risk that a buyer maintains.  See id. at app.  pt. I 
Comment Letters at 64, Arguments Againt the Resale Royalty (“More than 99% of all works of art created in a given 
year do not appreciate in value; they decline, if they can be sold at all.”).
72 Id. at 130 note 25. (“[A]rtists get a lump sum that can be invested and receive interest.”).
73 The interest is contingent because it will become due only if the buyer actually resells at auction the work during 
the period in which DdS is in effect.
74 Tʜᴇ Rᴇᴘᴏʀᴛ, supra note 15, at 72 (referring to the idea of the discounted sales price causing creators to earn less 
on a sale of their work if the buyer anticipates paying a royalty on a secondary sale).
 An issue that may arise in terms of a creator’s ability to gain more by  holding his VAs is 
whether sales and a market for the VAs are a necessary driver of their value.75  In other words, if 
the VAs are held by  the creator and never sold but are known to potential buyers, will they  be 
valued less, the same, or more than if the same VAs are freely  available to be bought.76  If the 
VAs are less valuable when owned only by the creator then sales are a necessary function for 
value. An existing market for them also allows for market-pricing mechanisms because without a 
pricing history it  is much harder to make a valuation.77 Increasing the value of an unsold cache of 
VAs is possible but without a market it is hard to determine the likelhood of increased value.
 It does not necessarily follow that buyers are unfairly gaining something that can never 
accrue to the creator even if VAs are valued lower when held by the creator and sales do drive 
their value.78  A buyer increases his risk precisely because potential buyers are a necessary 
component of value.79  Buyers are the raison d'être for value because they compete to own a VA 
and this demand imbues value into the VA. Without competition amongst buyers, prices would 
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75 Works gain value partially because of the existence of a market for the works to begin with. It is somewhat of a 
chicken and egg problem: value is unknown if there are no works available to be bought or sold, so the artist may 
always be at a disadvantage no matter how long he waited until he initially sells his works even if he is an 
objectively good artist.  See id. app. pt. I Comment Letters at 15,  Statement of Michael L. Ainslie President and Chief 
Executive Officer of Sotheyby’s Holdings, Inc. before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Patens, Copyrights and 
Trademarks, Hearings on S. 1619, December 3, 1987. 
76 Tʜᴇ Rᴇᴘᴏʀᴛ, supra note 15 app. pt. I Comment Letters at 76, Testimony of R. Frederick Woolworth in Opposition 
to H.R. 3221. Robert Rauschenberg’s works immediately went up in value tremendously upon the sale of his work 
by Mr. Scull (the event that prompted California’s DdS law), which is evidence that sales are necessary to create 
value but also that sales of resold works can immensely increase the value of unsold works, too, thus benefitting the 
creator without DdS.
77 Id at 136-7 (listing factors that can can impact the price of a work).
78  If greater value is only created when the creator sells and they are worth less when he holds them. This idea is 
premised more as a chicken and egg problem, meaning that buyers and people don’t know about the works and may 
not want the works if they are unavailable to be bought if there is no prestige available in owning them because the 
artist is an obscure artist by dint of the works not being available to view or buy.
79 Tʜᴇ Rᴇᴘᴏʀᴛ, supra note 15, at xii (“Market forces, rather than any metaphysical concept, drive the price and terms 
of an exchange and determine value. In a free market,  there is arguably no latent value of an object, rather it is only 
as valuable as the price a willing buyer will pay a willing seller at a given time.”).
be lower and nearer to the creator’s cost of making the VA. While buyers may  be gaining 
something that cannot accrue to the creator, that gain does not derive directly from the creator’s 
efforts because without buyers the VA does not have much independent monetary value.
 If VAs are valued the same no matter whether held by  the creator or owned by others, 
then both sides have equal risk profiles in either holding or buying the VA and the potential 
gains available to each are equal. 
 The buyer of a VA is effectively purchasing the risk of the VA market and not the risk of 
an individual VA. Most purchases are losing propositions and it is impossible to know which VA 
will become valuable. Unlike in the stock market, where a buyer has the ability  to compare facts 
and numbers, a VA buyer has only  intuition and taste to go on. Because of this lack of 
information, creators overall earn more than they otherwise would if it were known which 
specific creators’ VAs would increase in value. As a result, while the tiny  number of creators who 
do become successful earn less than they would otherwise if it  were known at the outset that they 
will become successful, many more creators come out ahead due to the unpredictability of 
success even though an individual creator may not be successful. As a result, buyers overall pay 
more than they would if the market was efficient. This is why an indivudal VA purchase is risky.
 The allocation of the rewards and losses that  flow from risk is a fundamental aspect of a 
market. Although creators do not play  an active role in the creation of the value imbued into the 
VA, which arises from the market itself, DdS gives creators an interest in gains with no 
concurrent risk after a creator has freely sold his VAs and chosen not to partake in that risk.
 B. Discounts Are Great! (If You Can Calculate Them)
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 DdS may impact both initial prices and later secondary prices of VAs because buyers may 
discount the royalty rate to its future expected value in the calculation of their maximum present 
buying price.80 The higher the sales value, the larger the discount. The biggest issue with making 
a discounted-price buying decision is that the future value of the VA from which you would be 
making the discount assumption is unknowable, although possibly estimable in absolute terms.81 
Because of this, paying a royalty-adjusted discounted purchase price is not likely. 
 A buyer can only speculate about whether a VA will be worth much in the future and 
hence be able to make a speculative assumption about how much of a discount to take.82  Taking 
a discount from an initial sales price would concern creators because it would reduce their 
present income with no guarantee of future royalties to make up for this reduction.83  But the 
value of the VA in an initial sale is likely inconsequential compared to what it may go for in the 
future and thus its purchase is a small investment.84  The buyer of a high-priced VA who has a 
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80 Leonard D. DuBoff, et al., Artists Rights: The Kennedy Proposal to Amend the Copyright Law, 7 Cardozo Arts & 
Ent. J. 227, 258 (1989) (“These investment-minded collectors would attempt to discount the price quoted in order to 
compensate for the amount potentially owed under the resale -royalty provision.”) (internal quotes omitted) .
81 Id. at 258 note 207 (explaining the many variables necessary to make such a calculation).
82 Perlmutter, supra note 13, at 409 (criticizing opponents of DdS who claim it will have a big impact while at the 
same time saying it will not be worth much to creators).
83  The discount would reduce creators’  income in two ways. First, at the time of the initial sale the discount 
reduces the amount paid to the creator. Second, discounts by secondary buyers in the amount of what they must pay 
as a royalty will concomitantly reduce the royalty. For example, assume a 5% royalty on what would normally sell 
for $100, with $100 being the buyer’s ceiling, the creator does not receive $5, which would make the total cost 
$105, but would instead receive $4.76 (5% of $95.24, or put otherwise, 105% of 95.24 equals $100. 
 There are also two ways DdS could work invidiously against creators as compared to the status quo. In the 
first case, if an initial buyer takes a discount with the assumption that he will sell it sometime within the DdS period 
but does not, then the creator will make less money than he would have otherwise. In the second case, if the future 
value of the money received by the creator is taken into account and the initial discount is large enough the creator 
could lose out if subsequent sales do not reach the expected valuation on which the discount was taken. This creates 
a situation where the future value of the money the creator received plus the royalty income turns out to be less than 
what the money would have been worth if the creator had received the an non-discounted sales price to start with.
84  See supra note 23 for one example. In a more contemporary example of secondary sales, works by Michael 
Basquiat struggled to break €25,000 in the mid 1980s while today some of his works are sold for millions of  dollars. 
For the purposes of this paper it will be assumed that this is adjusted to current exchange rates since the Euro did not 
exist then. Cᴏɴᴛᴇᴍᴘᴏʀᴀʀʏ Aʀᴛ Mᴀʀᴋᴇᴛ 2011/2012: Tʜᴇ Aʀᴛᴘʀɪᴄᴇ Aɴɴᴜᴀʟ Rᴇᴘᴏʀᴛ, supra note 33, at 27.
large investment will most likely  to take the discount into consideration85  because he is tying up 
large amounts of capital that could go towards other uses, as discussed in Subpart III-A. Not all 
buyers will take this route, especially Brag, but Investor and Beauty  might. It  is possible that 
buyers could take a discount but the likelihood of doing so is scant in light of the difficulty of 
making an informed decision based upon speculation about how much the VA will be worth and 
therefore the size of the discount to take.
 C. Royalty...What Royalty? Let’s Sell It Across The Border!
 If DdS becomes law in the United States, there is a possibility  that  VA owners may move 
their sales to countries without DdS.86 If this occurs, these countries could see an increase in their 
use as venues and creators would lose out from DdS’s benefits. While sellers would move to 
avoid paying DdS, the likelihood of this occurring is not high because the benefits of selling in 
the American market are  great and many buyers are not willing or able to buy VAs abroad. 
 Markets act in mostly-predictable ways when taxes are imposed and since DdS can be 
viewed as a sales tax on covered VAs, market  participants may respond by moving sales to 
jurisdictions without DdS.87  People and organizations affected by higher taxes often relocate to 
places with lower taxes so long as they can have better returns and efficiency in the new locale. 
While it takes longer and is more expensive to move when things like factories are involved, the 
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85 Assuming a  5% royalty rate,  a $50 discount off a $1000 work is much less likely to be worth consideration than a 
$50,000 discount off a $1 million work simply because the amount is so much larger no matter whether the buyer is 
extremely wealthy. See e.g. Jesse Drucker, How to Pay No Taxes: 10 Strategies Used By The Rich, Bʟᴏᴏᴍʙᴇʀɢ 
Bᴜsɪɴᴇssᴡᴇᴇᴋ,  April 17, 2012, http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-04-17/how-to-pay-no-taxes-10-
strategies-used-by-the-rich#p1 (last visited Dec. 6,  2012) (saying that the 400 highest-income Americans paid a 
lower effective tax rate than the next 1.4 million highest-income Americans).
86 See Goetzl & Sutton, supra note 13, at 48-49 (explaining how the French DdS system may cause sales that would 
normally have taken place in France to shift to other countries).
87  Tʜᴇ Rᴇᴘᴏʀᴛ,  supra note 15, at 99 (“A vocal minority, however, including some artists, representatives of 
museums, art galleries, auction houses, and legal experts argued against a resale royalty, calling it a tax...”).
location of a sales transaction is much simpler and cheaper to relocate. A DdS law based upon 
location of sale would would be easy to avoid  by  selling a VA in a country without DdS.88
 The Unites States is very large market and not every locale is suited or desirable to sell 
in, which dampens the likelihood of sales moving out of the United States.89  Sellers will only 
move their sales if the benefits of a move outweigh the costs90 and it is feasible that this will be 
true for some sellers. Desite the possible benefits from a move, a mass movement of sales out of 
the United States is unlikely because the United States market is simply too big and the benefits 
obtained from selling abroad are not great enough to counteract the negatives of selling abroad.
D. What Does This All Mean for the Market?
 Given all of these considerations, the effect that DdS may have on the VA market is 
strong. The potential effect on the market from buyers paying a discounted purchase price is low 
because it is too difficult to determine how much of a discount to make in addition to the fact that 
the overwhelming majority  of VAs will decline in value and thus negate the necessity for the 
discount. Secondary sales are highly unlikely to move out of the United States simply because 
the American market is wealthy and makes up  a large portion of the world art market and the 
benefit of moving away to avoid DdS would most likely be outweighed by fewer sales with 
lower prices. The negative impact from these two issues is weak, which makes them fall in favor 
of DdS.
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88  In the Matter of: Artists’ Resale Royalties,  supra note 56, at 262 (statement of Mitchell Zuckerman, President, 
Sotheby’s Financial Services Incorporated) (“If you layer additional transactional costs on top of [taxes and dealer 
payments],  it is absolutely certain that you will deflect some portion of business elsewhere into jurisdictions with 
lower transaction costs.”). 
89 Important consideration are availability of storage for VAs, level of taxes, ease of access and transport,  buyer and 
seller nearness, and other factors.
90 These costs can include moving away from a large pool of buyers or transacting in a less-favored currency,
 On the other hand, the shift  of who gains from risk will strongly  affect the market. While 
a small royalty amount would not seem to have a great impact, a lower reward for a big risk in 
the aggregate can have a big impact. Because most VAs decrease in value, buyers take a big risk 
when purchasing most VAs. The creator eliminated his risk when he could have kept the VA and 
DdS tries to piggy-back on the risk taken by the buyer and share only  gains. The result of a 
change in who gains from risk can adversely  affect the market  for all VAs because buyers will 
have less money with which to purchase other VAs and they  will take fewer risks because they 
will not be rewarded as much for taking that  risk. The negative affect from the shift in risk 
outweighs the small potential impact that would result from discounted purchase prices and 
sellers moving to different markets.
IV. Conclusion
A. DdS Is Too Uncertain and Speculative To Be A Useful Incentive
 The incentive created by DdS would certainly benefit  some artists at some point but it is 
too speculative to be a motivating incentive for creators to make more and higher quality  VAs. 
DdS fails as incentive for the three creators because given their motivations to create it is unable 
to effect a change in the quality  or quantity of their output. For Unique Creator, which is the only 
group it  would have the real potential to benefit, it  cannot improve or raise their output. It would 
simply  reward them more in return for nothing extra gained by society from them. It is possible 
that Career Creator and Hobbyist may increase their output because people tend to see rich 
rewards as more likely to accrue than is probable, but given their time and skills it is improbable 
that it would actually  benefit them in the long term even if their output increases because their 
28
ability  to create desirable, highly-valued works is limited. The effect on any of the three types of 
creators is simply not strong enough to improve their output  so that  it enriches society to a 
greater extent than it costs society.
B. Giving Rewards Without Risk Distorts Market Processes
 It is all too easy to decry a buyer who has purchased a VA for what seems a pittance and 
later turns around to sell it for a princely sum. Left out  of this equation are the innumerable VAs 
bought that decline in value or are valued barely more than the pittance for which they were 
bought. Owning VAs is not a gold mine. It is a risky  purchase that rarely  pays financial 
dividends. Buyers purchase VAs for various reasons and help the creators to earn a living when 
they  do so. Initial purchase prices are what they are because it is impossible to predict which 
creator will hit it big. 
 The frenzy of buyers seeking to own a specific VA is what creates a VA’s value. The 
aesthetics of the VA itself certainly create the object of desire, but what creates the value is 
competition among buyers. No one can say that a painting is intrinsically worth millions of 
dollars. Desire to own creates that price. In a normal market, the price of an object  is somewhere 
just above its cost to produce and for luxury objects a bit  higher. But an item that is sold for 
thousands of times its cost to produce derives its value not from its cost but from demand. The 
same is true with VAs.
 Buyers take a risk in purchasing a VA with the hope that other buyers in the future will 
continue to desire it so that its value increases. The creator gains only from the value of his VAs 
at the time he sells them because that is what they  are worth when he chooses to forgo holding 
any more risk in the VA. Further, because a buyer is buying the market risk and not the risk of an 
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individual VA, in the few times that a buyer does guess successfully on what is a risky  and 
uncertain purchase, his risk-taking must be rewarded because creators overall have benefitted 
from the risks taken by  buyers even if the creator of a specific highly-valued VA does not 
necessarily gain more than other creators.
 The argument for DdS as an equitable right is hampered by the creator’s sale of a VA 
because the risk of decreased value is solely on the owner. The owner who holds the risk in a VA 
is the one who should gain. The creator forsook any risk in the VA when he sold it and he did not 
have to do so - he chose to do so. The creator can still gain from any increases in his prior VAs’ 
value by selling new VAs that will hopefully be as highly valued. Further, if the VA’s value 
decreases the creator is not obligated to pay the owner anything for the decline. As such it is 
imprudent for the creator to gain from the VA’s increase.
 Even with DdS, while the creator and owner share the risk that gains will not be as large, 
the creator still does not have any real risk in the VA because he does not share decreases in 
value, which is the only real risk of ownership. A lesser gain is not a risk. The only way that  the 
creator does share the risk in the VA is if buyers discount their purchase prices to make up for the 
expectation that they will pay a royalty. This reduced payment creates an interest in the VA by 
way of the forgone payment portion. Nonetheless, this discount was determined to be unfeasible 
and so it will rarely  be a realistic consideration. Consequently, even with DdS the creator still 
does not share the risk of ownership.
C. It Ain’t So Sweet
 For all the foregoing reasons, DdS should not be implemented in the United States.
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